COVERAGE OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION LAWS
BERNiEcE N. LOTWIN*

A substantial factor in the current interest in, and recent enactment of, state
unemployment compensation laws is the fact that Tide IX of the Social Security Act1
has removed one of the most emphasized barriers to such laws by equalizing competitive costs between states so far as employers' contributions to unemployment compensation funds are concerned. As their name implies, unemployment compensation
laws are predicated upon the theory of accumulating reserves during periods of
employment, from which compensation is paid during periods of unemployment. If
such reserves are to be accumulated through contributions required from employers,
or from employers and employees, the employment coverage, the employer coverage
and the territorial coverage of a state unemployment compensation law are important
both for purposes of collecting contributions and of paying benefits to unemployed
and eligible individuals. In each type of coverage, the nature of the considerations
involved are distinctly different; and although the bases upon which contributions
are required and benefits are payable need not be coextensive, 2 the desire to protect
the solvency of funds from which benefits are paid will tend to cause the employment, employer and territorial coverage with respect to which contributions are
required, to be coterminous with those on the basis of which benefits are payable. 3
Employment coverage, the inclusion and exclusion of particular kinds of services,
is almost exclusively a matter of state policy. The provisions of Tide IX of the
Social Security Act,4 however, have apparently influenced several states to adopt
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'Act of Aug. 14, 1935, 49 STAT. 531, §§901-910, 42 U. S. C. A. 7, §§11oi-111o (1935).
'Cf. Head Money Cases, 12 U. S. 8o (1S); U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 317 (1936).
'All the state unemployment compensation laws enacted prior to February 1, 1936, so provide, although
individuals may be disqualified from receiving benefits based upon employment with respect to which
contributions have been paid.
'Section 9o of this title imposes an excise tax upon the employment of individuals; §§go2 and 909
permit employers subject both to that title and to a state unemployment compensation law which has been
approved by the Social Security Board under $903, to credit against go% of such excise tax, the amount of
contributions paid by them during the taxable year into the state unemployment fund or, with respect to
employers paying reduced contribution rates under conditions which meet the requirements of §gzo, not
in excess of 90% of the highest rate applicable under such state law to any employer subject thereto.
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definitions of employment which coincide with that contained in that title,5 or which
deviate from it very little.'
THE

EMPLOYING UNIT

If a state law is applicable to employers of one or more individuals, irrespective of
the period for which they are employed, problems incident to employer coverage are
reduced to a minimum. 7 But if a state law is applicable only to employers of a stated
number of individuals," or to employers of a stated number of individuals for a stated
period,9 various devices available to employers who seek to avoid coverage or to
reduce their contributions must be guarded against. Those most readily available
are independent contractor arrangements whereby no single employer employs the
stated number of individuals essential to coverage, ° and separate incorporations
whereby the same result is achieved, although unity of ownership and management
is maintained.11
It is clear that if enterprises, in which the stipulated number of individuals are
engaged for the stipulated periods required for coverage purposes, are permitted to
5

See the definitions of employment in the Alabama, California and Oregon laws. (The definitions to
which reference is made in this article are contained in the following sections of the respective state acts:
Ala. §2; Cal., art. 2, §§5-14; D. C. §i; Mass. §x; N. Y. §502; Ore. §2; Utah, §3; Wis. §108.02.)
'See the definitions of employment in the New Hampshire and District of Columbia laws. On the
other hand, the Washington law excludes only services performed in the employ of religious, charitable,
scientific, educational and similar non-profit organizations, and the New York law excludes, in addition,
only employment as a farm laborer and of a minor child or spouse.
'The District of Columbia law adopts this basis of employer coverage.
'The Utah law is applicable to employers of 4 or more persons, irrespective of the period for which
they are employed. Such classifications are no longer subject to question under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. St. Louis Cons. Coal Co. v. Illinois, x85 U. S. 203 (19o); Ward & Gow
v. Krinsky, 259 U. S.503 (1922).
The New York, New Hampshire and Washington laws cover employers of four or more persons for
13 weeks; the Oregon law, of four or more for 2o weeks; the Massachusetts, Alabama and California laws,
of eight or more for 20 weeks, and the Wisconsin law, of eight or more for x8 weeks. It appears probable
that the tax and credit provisions of Title IX of the Social Security Act, described in note 4, supra, will
tend to influence those states contemplating the enactment of unemployment compensation laws to adopt
the same test of employer coverage as occurs in that title, i.e., employers of eight or more individuals for
some portion of each of 2o different days, each day being in a different week (§907 (a)).
" The laws of Alabama, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Wisconsin and Washington include in the definition of the term "employer" a provision similar to the following, apparently intended to prevent such devices: "In determining whether an employer [of any person in the state] employs
enough persons to be an 'employer' subject hereto, and in determining for what contributions he is liable
hereunder, he shall, whenever he contracts with any contractor or subcontractor for any work which is
part of his usual trade, occupation, profession, or business, be deemed to employ all persons employed by
such contractor or subcontractor on such work, and he alone shall be liable for the contributions measured
by wages paid to such persons for such work; except as any such contractor or subcontractor, who would
in the absence of the foregoing provisions be liable to pay said contributions, accepts exclusive liability for
said contributions under an agreement with such employer made pursuant to general commission rules."
The laws of Alabama, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Washington and Wisconsin include in the definition of the term "employer" a provision similar to the following, apparently intended
to prevent such devices: ". . . where any person, partnership, association, corporation . .., either directly
or through a holding company or otherwise, has a majority control or ownership of otherwise separate
business enterprises employing persons in the state, all such enterprises shall be treated as a single 'employer' for the purposes of this act."
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exempt themselves from such coverage or to reduce their contributions by a series
of contracts with independent contractors, the policy and purposes of the law might

in a large measure be nullified; for coverage purposes, it is therefore essential that
employees of independent contractors who are engaged in work which is part of
the usual trade, occupation, profession or business of the principal, be deemed to be
employed by that principal, 1 2 irrespective of the purpose or effect of such independent contractor arrangement. The effect of such a provision in an unemployment
compensation law is to impose upon the business or enterprise in which such employees are engaged, the economic burden of the protective measure adopted.' 3
Similar provisions in state workmen's compensation laws have been uniformly sustained. 4 On the other hand, for contribution purposes, several alternatives are
possible: (I) the liability of such principal for contributions with respect to the
wages paid employees of such independent contractors might be absolute; 5 (2) the
liability of such principal for such contributions might be absolute, but accompanied
by a right to indemnity therefor against such contractors;' (3)such principal might
be only the guarantor of such contributions, the contractor being primarily liable and
the principal being secondarily liable in the event that such contractor is not responsible or is in default;' 7 or (4)such contractor might alone be liable for such
"The constitutionality of such a provision is not subject to challenge under the due process clause or
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the common law incidents of
the independent contractor relationship are affected. Cf. Pizitz Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U. S. 112, 116 (927).
The rationale upon which workmen's compensation laws have been sustained by the Supreme Court, and
which is equally applicable to unemployment compensation laws, does not require insistence upon a
technical master-and-servant relation. N. Y. Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. x88 (917); Ward &
Gow v. Krinsky, supra note 8; Pizitz Co. v. Yeldell, supra. See Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Ats (1914) 27 HAnv. L. Rav. 235, 344.
" The reason for including the employees of an independent contractor in determining the coverage and
contributions of his principal are equally applicable to a similar inclusion of independent contractors
engaged under the same conditions, irrespective of whether or not they have individuals in their employ.
The considerations for and against such inclusion involve matters that are without the scope of thisdiscussion. See Note (1926) 43 A. L. R. 345, §12, for a discussion of whether independent contractors, in
the absence of specific provisions, are within the purview of workmen's compensation acts.
"Under some state laws, the liability of the principal to the employees of the independent contractor
is absolute, Fox v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 107 Conn. 189, 193 Ad. 778 (1928); Bradley v. Steiner, 233
Mich. 312, 193 N. W. 897 (923); Cleland v. McLaurin, 40 Idaho 371, 232 Pac. 571 (1925); Purkable v.
Greenland Oil Co., 122 Kan. 720, 253 Pac. 219 (1927); under others, the liability of the principal is

conditioned upon the contractor's default or upon the principal's failure to require the contractor to insure
his compensation liability, Am. Steel Foundries Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 99, ri9 N. E. 9o2 (1918);
I. C. v. Everett, io8 Ohio St. 369, 14o N. E. 767 (1923); De Witt v. State, zo8 Ohio St. 513, 14z N. E. 551
(1923); and under others, the principal is liable as a guarantor of the contractor's obligation to insure his
employees, Corbett v. Starrett Bros., io5 N. J. L. 228, 143 Ad. 352 (1928); Clark v. Monarch Engineering Co., 248 N. Y. 107, 161 N. E. 436 (1928); Madison Entertainment Corp. v. Kleinheinz, 211 Wis
459, 248 N. W. 415 (1933).

See Note (1929) 58 A. L. P. 872.

' Provisions such as that quoted in note so, supra, are of thistype, with the qualification that ifthe
independent contractor is an "employer" as defined by reason of his own employment record, the principal
may be relieved of liability for contributions based upon wages paid to the employees of such contractors
under contractual arrangements between the principal and the contractor, made in accordance with rules
agency administering the law.
of the state
18 Cf. Madison Entertainment Corp. v. Kleinheinz, supra note 14.
'Cf. De Witt v.State, supra note 14.
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contributions, irrespective of whether he is subject to the law by reason of his own

employment record.' 8
It is immaterial, under a state law which is applicable to employers of a stated

number of individuals, or to employers to a stated number of individuals for a stated
period, whether such individuals work at one or more places of employment. 10 If
a concern conducts its business through ohe or more branches or units, for coverage

purposes such units constitute a single organization and the total number of employees engaged therein determines whether or not such concern is subject to the
law. If, on the other hand, such a concern owns or controls the same units through
the medium of separate corporations, unless such units are viewed together, the law
affords an opportunity for evasion by separating units into separate corporations, and
places a premium upon the segregation or separate incorporation of activities which
are normally conducted by a single concern or as branches of a single concern.2 0 The

complexity of the problem presented by the possibilities of evasion through corporate
affiliations cannot be minimized; 21 an innumerable variety of situations may occur:

one corporation may own all, the majority, or a controlling proportion of the capital
stock in another or other corporations; the stock in two or more corporations may be
controlled by the same interests, although the legal ownership is dispersed, the control
resting solely upon contract, acquiescence, the exigencies of business, or other con-

siderations. But as in the case of independent contractor arrangements, it would
seem essential to the policy and purposes of an unemployment compensation law
that the avoidance of coverage through separate incorporations be prohibited.
As a general rule, a corporation and its stockholders are deemed separate entities.2 2 But if a state has power to establish an unemployment compensation system,

it also possesses the power to insure its efficacy by prohibiting or disregarding devices
in evasion of it.2 3 Reasonable measures may be adopted to prevent an avoidance

of a valid tax or regulation, as a necessary adjunct to a general scheme within the
'If employers subject to a state law may secure reduced contribution rates on the basis of their
employment records, this arrangement may enable an employer to operate the seasonal or unstable portion
of his enterprise through independent contractors, and thereby secure reduced rates by avoiding charges
against his record for benefits paid to workers employed in that portion of the business.
"Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, supra note 8. Provisions to this effect, which occur in the definitions of
"employer" in the Alabama, California, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Washington
and Wisconsin unemployment compensation laws, appear unnecessary.
oOf course, no question occurs if each such unit employs a sufficient number of individuals for a
sufficient period to be subject to the law by reason of its own employment record. But if one or more
such units would not be so subject, even though all others would be covered, the reason for viewing all
such units as a single organization remains. Segregation would, of course, affect the reserves available
for benefits in a state adopting the employer reserve system.
"See, e.g., the volume of litigation under the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1918 and its amendments, particularly §240 (b), relating to consolidated income tax returns by affiliated corporations. See
Note (1930) 69 A. L. R. 1271; (1933) 85 A. L. R. 153. See, also BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); BoNwIuGHT AND MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY

(1932).

'Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Co., 267 U. S. 333 (1925); Klein v. Bd. of Supervisors, 282 U. S.
24 (1930).
'Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497, 505 (1930).
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legislative power. 24 And in considering the reasonableness of such measures, not
only the final purpose of the law, but also the means of its administration, the ways
it may be defeated, must be considered.2 5 The general rule with respect to the
separate identity of corporations is subject to the qualification that such separate
identity may be disregarded in exceptional situations where it otherwise would present an obstacle to the due protection of public rights. 26 The extent to which these
various doctrines will be held to permit the coverage of separately incorporated units
under the same management and control will in a large measure be dependent upon
the facts in the individual cases presented to the courts. Assuming that, for coverage
purposes, several closely affiliated corporations are viewed as a single entity, for
contribution purposes, each unit in the corporate organization should alone 27be liable
for the contributions measured by wages paid to individuals in its employ.
TERRITORIAL COVERAGE

The territorial coverage of a state unemployment compensation law is important
because of the comparatively wide territorial range in which a particular employer's
workers move, irrespective of state lines, and in which an individual worker with
disconnected periods of employment in several states may move. Social policy and
justice to contributors require that duplication of coverage, either by permitting
benefits to be collected from two or more states with respect to the same period of
29
unemployment, 23 or by requiring contributions in two or more states, based upon
"U. S. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,

220 U. S. 257 (i91i);

Second Employers' Liability Cases,

223 U. S.

1 (1911).

'St. John v. New York, 2o U. S. 633 (19o6); Tyler v. U. S., supra note 23.
' U. S. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 220 U. S. 257, at 272-274; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis
Civic Assoc., 247 U. S. 490, 500-50X (x918); cf. McCaskill Co. v. U. S.,216 U. S. 504 (910); U. S. v.
D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 238 U. S. 516 (1915); U. S. v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1920).
'In the tax cases, it is well established that the imposition of a tax upon one person, measured by the
property or income of another, constitutes an arbitrary taking of the first person's property without due
process of law. Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U. S. 206, 78 A. L. R. 346 (93); Schlesinger v.
Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932). And an otherwise unconsituational exaction cannot be justified by its necessity to prevent frauds and evasions. Hoeper v. Tax
Comm., supra; Heiner v. Dorman, supra. Although it may be reasonable to view all the units within a
closely affiliated corporate group as a single "employer" for coverage purposes, the same reasons do not
apply to requiring one such unit to pay contributions based upon wages paid by other units to individuals
in their employ.
' The soundness of the social policy against double benefits assumes that the benefits payable under a
state law are reasonable and adequate; as of Feb. 1, 1936, all the state laws enacted provided for compensation at the rate of 5o% of the full time weekly wage. The District of Columbia law established a rate
varying between 40 and 65%, depending upon the recipient's number of dependents. The Utah law
establishes a maximum benefit of $i8per week; all the other laws, a maximum of $15. Under workmen's
compensation laws, some states have permitted recovery in more than one state for the same injury,
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Price, 117 Tex. 173, 300 S. W. 667 (1927); some have required that
amounts recovered in other states be deducted from their own allowance, Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Comm., 203 Wis. 446, 234 N. W. 889 (i931); and some have refused compensation if compensation
for the same injury had been received in another state, Finkley v. Saenger Tailoring Shop, x96 N. E.
536 (Ind. 1935).
=Although contributions to state unemployment compensation funds probably do not constitute
"taxes," U. S. v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 317 (936); State v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., ioi Wash. 630,
172 Pac. 902 (1918); cf. Mt. Timber Co. v. Wash., 243 U. S. 219, 240 (1917); and the dissent of
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the same services, be avoided to the maximum extent practicable. On the other
hand, it is probable that states enacting unemployment compensation laws will
endeavor to secure the maximum coverage possible for their workers whose services
are rendered both within and without the state.
The absence of any federal legislation in the field of interstate commerce, and
the provisions of Section 906 of the Social Security Act eliminate problems of state
30
interference with interstate commerce.
Coverage problems which have occurred under workmen's compensation laws
present the closest analogies to those likely to occur under state unemployment
compensation laws. As indicated by such cases, the territorial range of employment
presents eight principal types of factual situations:
Case i. Employment entirely without the state, incidental to a business without the
state and performed under a contract made (a) in the state or (b) without
81
the state;
Case 2. Employment entirely without the state, localized without the state, but incidental to a business within the state and performed under a contract made
(a) in the state or (b) without the state:
Case 3. Employment having no fixed situs in any state, performed entirely without
the state, but incidental to a business within the state and performed under
a contract made (a) in the state or (b) without the state;
Case 4. Employment having no fixed localization in any state, performed in part
within the state, but incidental to a business without the state and performed
under a contract made (a) in the state or (b) without the state;
Case 5. Employment having no fixed localization in any state, performed in part
within the state, but incidental to a business within the state and performed
under a contract made (a) in the state or (b) without the state;
Case 6. Employment having a situs without the state, but with some employment
performed within the state which is incidental to or a part of the course of
the employment without the state;
Brandeis, J., in N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 167 (1917) (intimating that contributions to the Washington and New York workmen's compensation funds were "in the nature of a tax"),
the tendency of the tax cases indicate that it is the purpose of the Supreme Court to eliminate the substantial burden of multiple exactions upon the same economic interest. See Brown, Multiple Taxation by the
States (1935) 48 Ha-v. L. REV. 407. For an interesting analysis, see HARD o, DOtmLE TAxAoN OF
PROPERTY AND INCOhM (1933).
'The Federal Act, §9o6, deprives one required under a state law to make payments into a state unemployment fund of the defense that he is engaged in interstate commerce. That such authorization by
the federal government to states to extend their jurisdiction in such manner is valid, see In re Rahrer, 140
U. S. 545 (389o); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311 (3917).
'LIt appears immaterial whether employment of this type is localized in any other state or has no
fixed sims in any state; one state has advanced the theory that employment under a contract of hire made
within the state has a sims therein until a different sims is acquired elsewhere. Val Blatz Brewing Co. v.
Industrial Comm., 201 Wis. 474, 23o N. W. 622 (1930), although the broad language in this case is
questioned in a later decision. See Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra note 28.
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Case 7. Employment having a situs within the state but with some employment
without the state which is incidental to or a part of the course of the em-

ployment within the state; and
entirely within the state.32
Employment
8.
Case
Like workmen's compensation laws3 3 unemployment compensation laws operate
upon an employer-employee relationship; that relationship may be created by a contract, but the rights and liabilities which the law creates are neither contractual nor
tortious in their nature, and arise out of the law itself rather than out of a contract
of employment. But, unlike workmen's compensation laws such as exist in the vast

majority of states, an unemployment compensation law does not create rights and
liabilities between the parties to that relationship but rather, imposes a liability to the
state upon those subject to pay contributions, and creates rights against the state in
favor of those eligible for benefits.
Assuming the validity of an unemployment compensation law under the state
and federal constitutions, there can be no doubt that a state may apply its law to
employment entirely within the state, irrespective of the residence of the employee,
the situs of the business for which it is performed, or the place where the contract of
employment is made.34 Similarly, there can be no doubt that a state may not impose
rights and liabilities with respect to employment entirely without the state incidental
to a business without the state and performed under a contract of hire made without
the state 36 irrespective of the residence of the employee, 6 or whether or not such
employment has a situs in any state. Cases I and 8 may therefore be dismissed without further comment.
Cases involving the application of workmen's compensation laws which establish

monopolistic state compensation funds to which employers are required to pay assessments and from which compensation is paid by the state in lieu of all direct liabilities
between employers and employees, present a precise analogy to situations which may
arise under unemployment laws. There are five such reported cases: Altman v.
"2 If the nature of an unemployment compensation law is held to be a regulation of the act of hiring
an employee or a regulation of enterprises in the conduct of which employees are engaged, the place where
the contract of hire is made, or the situs of the business for which the services are performed, becomes the
significant factor in Cases 7 and 8.
, Since the liability to pay compensation for injuries is created by the law, irrespective of its elective
or compulsory features, no distinction is made between elective and compulsory workmen's compensation
laws. Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 224 N. Y. 9, i9 N. E. 878 (1918); Anderson v. Miller Scrap
Iron Co., 170 Wis. 275, I7o N. W. 275 (i959); Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Law
(1927) 1I MINN. L. REv. 329, 333-

" 4Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra note 28.
The principle that the Federal Constitution requires that each state shall confine its legislation to
transactions within its borders and that the erroneous extraterritorial application of a state statute involves
a denial of constitutional rights under the due process clause is well settled. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head,
234 U. S. 149, 161 (1914); N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357 (3938); St. Louis Compress Co.
v. Arkansas, 26o U. S. 346 (1922).
" See notes 54 and 55, infra.
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North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau;37 Industrial Commission of Ohio
3 8 Johnson v. Industrial
v. Gardinio;
Commission of Ohio;39 Hilding v. Washington

Department of Labor and Industry;40 and Murray v. Gerrick and Company.41 In
each of these cases, the sole test applied by the court was the place of performance

of the work. Because in each case the work was performed entirely without the
state, compensation was denied in the Altman, Gardinio,Johnson, and Murray cases,

even though the business for which the work was performed, the residence of the
employee, and the place of making the contract of employment, was within the
state.4 2 Primarily the decisions construe the laws as not intended to apply to work
performed entirely without the state, and therefore throw little light upon the power
of the state to require assessments with respect to such work, or to pay compensation
for such injuries. Only in the Gardinio and Altman cases does the court intimate
that the state was without power to require assessments from the resident employer
with respect to, or to make regulations with respect to, employment localized without
43
the state.
In the Hilding case, the Washington law was held applicable to service without
the state, incidental to or a part of the course of service localized within the state.
Dicta in the Gardinio and Altman cases approve a similar application of the Ohio
44
and North Dakota laws.
The Altman, Gardinio, Johnson and Murray cases involved facts of the type

S5o N. D. 215, 195 N. W. 287, 28 A. L. R. 1337 (1923). Contract of employment made in North
Dakota, with an employee, resident therein, by an employer, who conducted business operations in that
state as well as several other states, to do work solely in the state of Washington, where the employee
sustained injury. Compensation denied.
83i19 Ohio St. 539, x64 N. E. 758 (1929). Contract of employment made in Ohio with an employee,
resident therein, by an Ohio corporation to do work solely in another state, where the employee sustained
injury. Compensation denied.
"45 Ohio App. 125, 186 N. E. 5o9 (1932). Same facts as in Gardinio case, plus the additional factor
that the contract of employment provided that it was to be governed by the law of the place of performance. Compensation denied.
to 162 Wash. 168, 298 Pac. 321 (r931). Contract of employment made in the state with an employee,
resident therein, by an employer whose business was conducted within the state to do work in the state.
In the course of such work employee sustained injury while temporarily driving through another state.
Compensation awarded.
a172 Wash. 365, 2o P. (2d) 591 (933), afl'd on other grounds, 291 U. S. 315 (934).
Contract of
employment made in the state with an employee, resident therein, by an employer doing business both
within and without the state, to do work entirely without the state, payment however to be for each hour
from the time the employee left his home in the state in the morning until his return in the evening.
Compensation denied.
" Both the Ohio and North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Acts, under which the Altman, Gardinio,
and Johnson cases were decided, contained a specific provision that compensation should be payable to
every injured employee, "wheresoever such injury has occurred."
'The court in the Altman case said: "We do not believe that the Legislature intended to require local
industries to carry hazards of occupations or employments, the situs of which is in a foreign jurisdiction
and beyond the borders of the state, and not merely incidental to a business or occupation within the
state, and which cannot, as a matter of law, be required to, and do not in fact, contribute to the compensation fund in the form of a premium collected from the proprietor of the business or industry." 50
N. D. at 225, 595 N. 'W. at 291.

"The Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act is apparently being administered in accordance with this
dicta. See Finkley v. Saenger Tailoring Shop, supra note 28.
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noted in Case 2. On the other hand, several states whose workmen's compensation
laws do not establish monopolistic insurance funds from which the state pays compensation, but who regulate the rights and liabilities between employers and em-

ployees, requiring employers to carry insurance with private or public insurance
carriers, have held their laws applicable to the same facts,45 and to factual situations
4
of the type noted in Cases 3,46 4,47 5,4 8 and 6.9
The great weight of opinion under the various state workmen's compensation

laws sustains their application to services rendered without the state which are incidental to, or a part of the course of, employment localized within the state. The valid
application of state unemployment compensation laws to factual situations of the

type noted in Case 7 therefore seems clear. 50 Conversely, although a state may apply
its law to employment within the state which is incidental to or a part of the course
"Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm., I Cal. (2d) 250, 34 P. (2d) 76 (r934), afl'd, 294
U. S. 532 (935); Hulswit v. Escanaba Mfg. Co., 218 Mich. 331, 188 N. W. 41 (1922); Smith v. Van
Noy Interstate Co. 15o Tenn. 25, 262 S. 'W.1048 (1924). (Contracts made within the state. No cases
found in which the law of a state was held applicable to this type of factual situation in which the contract
was made without the state.)
" Beall Bros. Supply Co. v. Industrial Comm., 341 Ill. 193, 173 N. E. 64 (1930) (Contract made
within the state. No cases found in which the law of a state was held applicable to this type of factual
situation in which the contract was made without the state.)
"McKesson-Fuller-Morrisson Co. v. Industrial Commission, 212 Wis. 507, 250 N. W. 396 (1933);
Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 119 Me. 552, 12 Ad. 516 (19=2); Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp. v.
Industrial Comm. 32 Ariz. 235, 257 Pac. 644 (1927).
'State ex rel. Chambers v. District Court, 139 Minn. 205, 166 N. W. 185 (1918); Kennerson v.
Thames Tow Boat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Ad. 372 (1915); Tallman v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 2.59
N. Y. 512, 182 N. E. I59 (932).
(Contracts made in the state.) Ginsberg v. Byers, 171 Minn. 366, 2r4
N. W. 55 (927).
(Contract made without the state.)
"Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra note 28.
'5 The District of Columbia and eight state unemployment compensation laws enacted prior to Feb. i,
1936 provide for the coverage of such employment by provisions under which employment "all or the
greater part" of which is performed within the state, is subject to the law. The New Hampshire, Washington, Oregon, Alabama, and Massachusetts laws are limited to cases in which the greater part of the
employment is "customarily" performed within the state, but do not indicate the period, on the basis of
which the place where the greater part of the employment is rendered, is to be determined. Presumably,
such periods are to be prescribed by the agency administering the law. The Wisconsin and California laws
prescribe a week as the determining period, the former applying only to employment during any week
in which all or the greater part of the person's hours of work are performed within the state, and the
latter applying only to employment during any week in which all or the greater part of the work is
"customarily" performed within the state. The New Hampshire, Washington, Alabama and Massachusetts
laws specifically purport to cover incidental employment without the state by providing that "such employment" (i.e., all or the greater part of which is performed within the state) shall include the person's
entire employment, but apparently the same result is intended under the other laws which do not include
such a provision. The difficulty inherent in the "all or greater part" test, particularly in a law such as
Wisconsin's, is that weeks in which the employee is sent without the state for four or more days, upon
temporary work in the course of his local employment, are exempted from the application of the law.
A probable additional reason for the "all or greater part" test is the desire to avoid duplication of coverage,
but that end will be accomplished only if those states, whose laws are limited to such employment when
it is "customarily" so performed within the state, adopt substantially uniform standards for determining
such customary employment. The New York law, on the other hand, will tend to defeat efforts to avoid
duplication of coverage because it purports to cover employment in which either all or the greater part
of the work is to be performed within the state or the contract of employment is entered into, and the
work is in any part to be performed, within the state. The Utah law apparently adopts the test of the
workmen's compensation laws; it is applicable to "any employment" by an employer.
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of employment localized without the state51 (Case 7) and may find sufficient
elements in the case upon the basis of which it might cover the entire employment
both within and without the state, states seeking to avoid duplication of coverage
will probably refrain from applying their laws to either the employment within the
52
state or the entire employment.

Ultimately, the power of the state to require contributions with respect to the
types of factual situations noted in Cases 2, 3, 4 and 5 is dependent upon the question
of fact whether there are, in such cases, things done within the state of which the
state may properly lay hold as the basis of the regulation imposed, and the test
applied by the Supreme Court under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the reasonableness of such things as the basis for the regulation
involved. 58
Residence of the employee, without more, appears clearly unreasonable;" 4 moreover, the privileges and immunities clause and the equal protection clause of the
Federal Constitution would seem to preclude a state from confining the extraterritorial application of its law to residents of the state.5 5 But residence of the employee,
when accompanied by other bases for regulation, may be a factor in support of the
reasonableness of the application of the state laW. 50
Prima facie, an unemployment compensation law appears to be a regulation of
'Interstate

Power Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra note 28; Am. Radiator Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. L.

436, 92 Ad. 85, 94 Ad. 85 (1914).

' Several state courts have denied the application of their state workmen's compensation laws under
such facts, even though the injury occurred within their borders. Proper v. Polley, 259 N. Y. 516, 182
N. E. i6i (932); Norman v. Hartman Furniture Co., 84 Ind. App. 173, 15o N. E. 46 (1926).
'Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 294 U. S.532 (1935); Note, A1Factual Approach to
the ConstitutionalAspects of the Conflict of Laws, the Alaska Packers Case (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 751.
See dissents in N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, supra note 35, and Compania General v. Collector, 275 U. S.
87, 99 (1927). In the Alaska Packers case, the Court overruled the contention that it violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to apply the California Workmen's Compensation Act to
an injury sustained in Alaska by an employee hired under a contract of employment made in California
to work exclusively in Alaska. However, too much reliance should not be placed upon that case, both
because of the peculiar circumstances involved and because the Court apparently regarded the California
Act as a regulation of the rights and liabilities between the parties to the contract of employment made
within the state, under the familiar rule that the laws of the place where a contract is made enter into
and form a part of that contract, as fully as if they had been expressly referred to or incorporated in its
terms. Citizens Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636, 644 (1899); Farmers Bank v. Fed. Res.
Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 66o (1923). The Court said, at p. 54o: "But where the contract is entered into
within the state, even though it is to be performed elsewhere, its terms, its obligations, and its sanctions
are subject, in some measure, to the legislative control of the state. The fact that the contract is to be
performed elsewhere does not of itself put these incidents beyond reach of the power which a state may
constitutionally exercise."
No
"rN.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, supra note 35; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick 28! U. S. 381, 397 (93o).
cases have been found which apply a state workmen's compensation law solely on the basis of the
residence of the employee, although several mention it in passing.
SQuong Ham Wah v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. o21 (1920), writ of error denied,
255 U. S. 445 (192r); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915).
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932); Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Industrial
Cl,
Comm., supra note 3r; Esau v. Smith Bros., 124 Neb. 217, 221, 246 N. W. 230, 232 (1933).
Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Pa., 238 U. S. 143 (1915); Provident Svgs. Ass'n v. Kentucky, 239 U. S. 03
(1915); Compania General v. Collector, 275 U. S. at 98.
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an employer-employee relationship. If such is the nature of the regulation, the
logical test of the coverage of a state law is the place of performance of the work,
irrespective of the situs of the business for which it is performed, of 'the residence of
the employee and of the place where the contract of employment is made." Such
a test will exclude from the application of a state law the factual situations noted in
Cases 2s and 3,59 will permit the application of the state law to the services performed within the state in the factual situations noted in Cases 4, 5, 6 and 7,60 and
to the entire services performed both within and without the state in Case 7,"1 but
will exclude from the application of the state law the services performed without the
state in Cases 4, 5, and 6.62
On the other hand, an unemployment compensation law might with propriety be
regarded as a law attaching rights and liabilities to the act of hiring an employee,63
or a law attaching rights and liabilities to the conduct of an enterprise in which employees are engaged,64 the extent of the rights and liabilities in each case being measured by the wages paid for, and the duration of, the services rendered. 5 If the law is
regarded as a regulation of the act of hiring an employee, the test of the application
of the law should be the place where the contract of employment is made; if it is
regarded as a regulation of the conduct of an enterprise in which employees are
engaged, the test should be the situs of the business for which the services are performed; each test will determine the coverage or the exclusion from coverage of
Cf. Note (1933) io N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 518, 522, 523.
Altman v. N. D. Workmen's Comp. Bureau, supra note 37; Industrial Comm. v. Gardinio, supra
note 38. Cf. Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, x69 N. E. 622 (930).
'Wandersee v. Moskewitz, 198 Wis. 345, 223 N. W. 837 (1929); Baggs v. Standard Oil Co., i8o
N. Y. Supp. 560 (1920).
'Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 119 Me. 552, 112 At. 516 (192s) (Case 4); Tallman v. Colonial
Air Transport, supra note 48 (Case 5); Hagenbeck v. Randall, 75 Ind. App. 47, 126 N. E. 501 (192o).
'Smith

v. Aerovane Utilities Corp., 259 N. Y. 126, 1S

N. E. 72 (1932); Anderson v. Miller Scrap

Iron Co., supra note 33.
'Norman v. Hartman Furniture Co., supra note 52.
'Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm., supra note 53; Beall Bros. Supply Co. v. Industrial
Comm., supra note 46.
"Penwell v. Anderson, 125 Neb. 449, 250 N. W. 665 (1933) and cases there cited; Brameld v. Dickinson Co., z86 Minn. 89, 242 N. W. 465 (932), Ginsburg v. Byers, 171 Minn. 366, 214 N. W. 55
In the Penwell
(1927); Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lbr. Co., 59 La. App. 504, 140 So. 867 (1932).

case, the Court said (250 N. W. at 666) that "the law was enacted for the purpose of requiring industry
to bear a part of the burden occasioned by accidental injuries to the workmen engaged therein when such
injuries arise out of and in the course of the employment" and that "In determining whether the Compensation Act is applicable to a particular case, it is of prime importance to determine the location of
the industry. If the industry in which the workman is employed is located in this state, he is, ordinarily,
entitled to the protection of the Nebraska Compensation Law, and this applies even though his injury
may occur in another state, if the work that he was doing was a part of the industry being carried on
in this state and was incident thereto. Domicile of the employer or employee or the place where the
contract was entered into are not, in themselves, controlling, although those factors may be circumstances
in aid in ascertaining whether the industry is located within the state." This might, with equal
appropriateness, have been said with respect to an unemployment compensation law.
Cf. Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Penna., supra note 56, and Compania General v. Collector, supra note
53, sustaining the power of a state to measure regulatory exactions by amounts paid under contracts which
such state had no power to prevent or regulate.
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the types of factual situations noted and the materiality of the things done within
the state which the state might have properly regarded as a basis for its regulation.
The coverage of the migratory worker with disconnected periods of employment
in several states, in addition to the type of problem heretofore discussed, involves
problems connected with the payment of benefits. The maintenance of an unemployment compensation system as a plan for compensating involuntary unemployment requires not only that a recipient of benefits accept suitable work when it is
offered to him, but also that such recipient of benefits report periodically to establish
his continued unemployment and to collect his benefits. 6 Assuming that a migratory
worker with disconnected periods of employment in several states accumulates potential rights to benefits in each state in which he has been employed, upon becoming
unemployed and eligible for benefits such a worker would be required to move from
state to state in order to report his unemployment and collect the benefits payable in
each state. The necessity for some arrangement whereby such an individual might
collect benefits in a single state, based upon his employment in all the states in which
he has accumulated rights thereto, is apparent.
Such an arrangement involves serious difficulties. Should the law of each state
in which employment has been performed apply with respect to the benefits based
upon such employment, or should the law of the state in which benefits are being
paid apply exclusively, irrespective of its differences from the laws of the states where
the rights to benefits were accumulated? Assuming that the laws of the states where
the employment has been rendered provide for merit ratings, whereby an employer's
rate of contribution may be increased or decreased in accordance with the relation
between his paid contributions and the benefits charged against his account, are
employers whose records are to be charged with benefits paid in another state to be
given an opportunity to be heard upon, or to dispute, claims which they contend
should not be allowed, and if so, how is such hearing to be provided?O7 In order to
maintain the solvency of the unemployment compensation fund of the state which
pays such benefits, how is that state to be reimbursed for benefits based upon employment in other states? There are other difficulties which must be solved, but the
foregoing illustrate the more obvious questions.
Several state laws contain provisions whereby such arrangements may be made
'Under the Social Security Act, §§303 (a) (2) and 903 (a) (i), one of the conditions upon which
a state may receive grants in aid of the administration of its law, and upon which employers subject
thereto may secure credit against the federal tax, is that the state law require all compensation to be paid
through public employment offices in the state or such other agencies as the Social Security Board may
approve.
'Unemployment compensation laws generally either provide for a limited disqualification period for,
or for a total disqualification of, otherwise eligible individuals who have voluntarily left their employment
or have been discharged for misconduct. Unless, at the time that a migratory worker leaves a particular
employer in the state, the proper state agency determines whether or not he was discharged for misconduct or such leaving was voluntary, the question will not be raised by the employer until the worker
applies for benefits based upon such employment.
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through reciprocal agreements between states.68 Reciprocal legislation, providing
for the payment of benefits to migratory workers, based upon employment in other
states and conditioned upon like treatment by such other states of individuals entitled
to potential benefits under the law of the first state is a possible method of solving
the problem. 69 It has also been urged that the federal government, through the
70
machinery made available in the operation of the Unemployment Trust Fund,
serve as a clearing agency for the reimbursement of states who pay unemployment
compensation based upon employment in other states.
The problem is now a subject of study and discussion among the various states
having or contemplating the enactment of unemployment compensation laws. Its
solution by an administratively practical plan will probably require much of the
experimentation that is characteristic of the development of our legislation and
administrative procedures in the field of social legislation.
'See, e.g., the laws of the District of Columbia, Alabama, New Hampshire and Washington. Such
reciprocal agreements will probably require the consent of Congress under Article I, Section so, of the
Federal Constitution. See Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study
in Interstate Adjustments (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 685; Donovan, State Compacts as a Method of Settling
Common Problems of Several States (193i) 8o U. oF PA. L. Rav. 5; Note ('935) 35 CO-. L. REv. 76.
'The scheme of reciprocal legislaton has been frequently adopted in tax statutes. See, e.g., WAsH.
REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §1203-1. See also Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o, 167-168
(1916).
"Under the Social Security Act, §§303 (a) (4), 903 (a) (3), another of the conditions upon which
the grants in aid and credits, mentioned in note 66, may be allowed is that the state law require all
contributions paid to the state to be deposited in the Unemployment Trust Fund, maintained in the
United States Treasury pursuant to §904 of the Act. It is contemplated that from that fund, the depositing states will make necessary requisitions for the payment of benefits, to the extent, of course, of their
deposits therein.

